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Introduction 
There has been considerable debate recently about whether health services need to be free 
at the point of service to ensure equitable access. Cambodia is a low-income country 
where provision of and access to health services remain problematic despite substantial 
increase in government health expenditures in the past decade (1). User charges have 
been introduced in the public health sector since 1996 as part of overall health financing 
reforms to improve access to health services for the population, especially for the poor. 
We examine here how Cambodia has reformed its health financing system to ensure 
access without removing user fees (UF). The Cambodian experience suggests that, in 
resource-poor settings, carefully designed UF systems may positively benefit health 
service delivery, while negative effects of these systems on access of populations can be 
mitigated by viable alternatives such as targeted subsidies. 
 
Rationale for introducing user charges 
Until 1996, public health services were “free for all”. The low level of state funding and 
salaries of staff became major constraints to effective implementation of this policy. To 
earn a living, health personnel had to find alternative incomes, including private practices 
and/or charging informal fees in public facilities. Amounts of informal fees could be 
substantial and often had to be paid upfront even in emergency situations. It was 
estimated that about 45% of the facility revenues came from under-the-table payments (2). 
This practice obviously benefited individual staff, but not the health facilities nor the 
health system and was harmful to patients. Moreover, a growing number of NGOs 
supporting health service delivery throughout the country initiated unregulated financial 
participation schemes.  
In 1996, the National Charter on Health Financing (3) was adopted. The Charter officially 
allowed implementation of user charges and financial participation schemes at facility 
level, thereby providing a legal framework to ensure minimum standards and pre-
requisites, in a context where formal or informal fees were already charged in an 
unregulated manner. Since then, formal user fees have been gradually initiated in all 
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public health facilities throughout the country. In 2008, almost 100% of government 
health facilities had implemented UF schemes (1). 
 
A few provisions in the Charter allow, at least in theory, oversight and ownership of UF 
schemes: 
  
- At Community level: the Charter prescribes that UF should be established by Health 
Center Management Committees (HCMC), in which community participation should be 
ensured. The HCMC has the responsibility to set the UF at a level “affordable for the 
community” and which vary depending on the local context. This provision introduced a 
relative ownership of the community in the management and financing of their local 
health centers. 
 
- At central level: schemes need to be submitted to MOH for approval. The allocation of 
UF revenues is established by government decree: 99% of income is kept at facility and 
spent for staff incentive (60%) and operational costs (39%). A 1% tax is levied by 
national treasury. The MOH is tasked to monitor income and expenditure from UF. 
 
- At facility level: although basic salaries have increased, they remain below living wages 
and the incentive from UF is an important addition. Availability of immediate cash for 
recurrent cost is also an important improvement in health center and hospital 
management. Reports from the field indicate that these funds effectively supplement 
government budget, can be used in a more flexible and independent fashion by facility 
managers and increase their sense of responsibility. 
 
In addition to the above provisions, the Charter also emphasized the necessity of granting 
exemptions to poor patients. Community participation in implementation and monitoring 
of the schemes was seen as a safeguard for effective  implementation of the exemption 
system although no subsidies were clearly identified.  
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Finally, it is essential to put the Charter in the context of a larger set of reforms initiated 
in the late 1990's and early 2000. While the Health Coverage Plan established the 
distribution of infrastructure and staff, budget and administrative reforms aimed at 
addressing the constraints of state budget for health as the first and main source of 
funding for public health facilities. To date, hospitals and health centers heavily rely on 
their national budget allocation and there is a commitment from the government to 
sustain and even increase tax-funded support to health service delivery. As UF are not set 
at cost-recovery level, they are not intended to replace government funding for health. 
 
Available evidence on the impact of user fees and exemptions 
Revenues from UF totalled only US$ 6.9 million in 2008 and represented a per capita 
annual expenditure of US$ 0.52 (1). Despite their small share in the total health sector 
funding, UF have proven successful in achieving some of their intended objectives, 
especially at primary health care level. 
An early assessment of the impact of UF in 2001 (4) shows that activity levels 
substantially increased as a result of improved staff attendance, better maintenance and 
supplies and improved management practices. The same assessment concludes that UF 
schemes also improved transparency in most facilities due to the necessity of accounting 
for the new cash income, while decreasing or eliminating unofficial payments in most 
rural areas. At health center level, the "low official fee levels, the readily accessible 
exemption schemes and the virtual elimination of unofficial fees" even contributed to 
increase access for the poor (4). Barber et al (2) confirm these findings and show that the 
introduction of UF controlled unpredictability of hospital fees, increased utilization of 
essential services and decreased hospital dependence on donor support. Akashi et al (5) 
report similar results at the National Maternal and Child Health Center in Phnom Penh. 
Wilkinson et al (4) however insist that the positive effect of UF is better observed at 
primary health care level compared to secondary and tertiary care. The necessity of 
keeping charges affordable for communities is not easily translated in fee schedules for 
more complex care. Community participation in facility management is also more 
theoretical for secondary and tertiary levels of care. Proximity of staff with the population 
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at health center allows more casual access to exemption schemes for poor patients, while 
a more formal screening process is necessary for hospital admissions. Other publications 
confirm that UF may have a potential risk of negative effect on access to care for more 
vulnerable populations in Cambodia (6,7). The same sources however orient policy 
makers towards more effective implementation of exemption arrangements within the 
context of the Health Financing Charter. Indeed, there is a general agreement that 
removal of UF in Cambodia may jeopardize the fragile balance of local health systems 
created by the Charter reform, but there is also concerns that exemption systems without 
proper subsidies are not effective. Cambodian policy makers therefore see a viable 
alternative in targeted subsidies for the poor channeled through Health Equity Funds 
(HEFs). The main purpose of HEFs is to reimburse facilities for services provided to poor 
patients. They also reimburse transport cost and provide food allowances for caretakers, 
and therefore address other major financial barriers to accessing health care (8). These 
barriers cannot be removed by the abolition of user charges. After an initial pilot stage, 
HEF have become the major pro-poor approach in health financing in Cambodia and the 
MOH has set an of objective national roll-out of these schemes by 2012. They are 
currently covering 65% of their target population (1). They demonstrate success in 
increasing access and utilization of underserved poor populations (6, 7,8). 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
In their comparison of removal of UF in Uganda and targeted subsidies in Cambodia, 
Meessen et al (7) stress that a pro-poor health financing policy is much more than a 
technical issue and should be put in the perspective of overall political and economic 
context. In Cambodia, user charges are supported by a strong budgetary and institutional 
government commitment, as demonstrated by the complete set of reforms initiated in the 
90's and complemented by more recent provisions with regard internal contracting. 
However, there is a need to complete implementation of this set of reforms. User charges 
introduced a certain degree of output-based financing in a system which was mainly 
relying on inputs unrelated to performance (7). Health Equity Funds used this opportunity 
to introduce more effective purchasing of services for the poor (8). Consistently, a more 
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efficient allocation and use of current tax-funded health budget should be possible 
through programme based-budgeting and results-based financing arrangements. More 
recent reforms in the context of decentralization introduced internal contracting within 
the public administration and should be effectively used as an avenue to channel both 
domestic and donor funding with the essential objective of performance and equity in 
health service delivery. In this context, UF can play an important role in the overall health 
financing system without deterring access. Their negative impact on access to health 
services for the poor can be mitigated by targeted subsidies. 
 
 
References 
 
1 Ministry of Health Cambodia 2009. Annual Health Financing Report 2008. 
2 Barber S, Bonnet F, Bekedam H. 2004. Formalizing under-the-table payments to 
control out-of-pocket hospital expenditures in Cambodia. Health Policy and Planning: 
19(4): 199-208 
3 Ministry of Health Cambodia 1996, no 296. National Charter on Health Financing in 
the Kingdom of Cambodia 
4 Wilkinson D, Holloway J, Fallavier P 2001. The Impact of user fees on access, equity 
and health provider practices in Cambodia. Report prepared for Health Economics Task 
Force, MOH/WHO Health Sector Reform Phase 3 
5 Akashi H, Yamada T, huot E, Kanal K and Sugimodo T 2004. User fees at public 
hospital in Cambodia: effects on hospital performance and provider attitudes. Social 
Sciences and  Medicines 58 (2004): 553-564 
6 Hardeman W, Van Damme W, van Pelt M, Ir P, Kimvan H, Meessen B 2004. Access to 
health care for all? Use fees plus a Health Equity Fund In Sotnikum, Cambodia. Health 
Policy and Planning 19(1): 22-32 
7 Meessen B, Van Damme W, Tashobya CK, Tibouti A: Poverty and user fees for public 
health care in low-income countries: lessons from Uganda and Cambodia. Lancet 2006, 
368: 2253-2257 
8 Bigdeli M, Annear P. 2009. Barriers to access and the purchasing function of health 
equity funds: lessons from Cambodia. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 87(7): 
560-6 
 
 7 
